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Lotze and the Classical Pragmatists
Christopher Hookway
1 It has been said that, after the fall of modernism, Hermann Lotze (1817-81) reigned as the
single most influential philosopher in Germany, perhaps the world” (Sullivan 2008: 2).1 It
is  now not  easy to  take such claims about  Lotze seriously,  and historical  surveys  of
nineteenth century philosophy treat him as a marginal figure, if they mention him at all.
Part  of  the  explanation  of  this  change  in  his  standing  becomes  clear  if  we  accept
Sullivan’s helpful observation that Lotze was a ‘prominent figure within an essentially
transitional period’ in philosophy (Sullivan 2008: 2-3). It is a mark of his international
prominence that the Harvard philosopher George Santayana wrote a PhD dissertation on
Lotze’s System of Philosophy, Oxford philosopher Bernard Bosanquet edited translations of
his major books on Logic and Metaphysics, and he is taken seriously in the writings of
Bertrand Russell  and Bradley.  This  paper  documents  his  role  in  the  development of
pragmatism.  He made a  positive  contribution to  William James’s  psychology and his
writings on pragmatism; and Dewey’s instrumentalist approach to logic was developed
through critical engagement with Lotze’s work.
2 David Sullivan has described Lotze’s work as transitional between post-enlightenment
movements such as  materialism and romanticism and developments characteristic  of
early twentieth century philosophies such as the logical analysis of Frege and Russell and
Husserl’s  phenomenology.  Often  seen  as an  idealist,  he  was  most  plausibly  read  as
preserving a  broadly Leibnizian tradition.  Lotze’s  marginal  roles  in most  histories  of
philosophy can be  explained by  the  fact  that  he  was ‘a  prominent  figure  within  an
essentially transitional period’: ‘his long shadow was, perhaps, predestined to gradually
fade from the scene’ (Sullivan 2008).
3 The  description  of  Lotze  as  ‘transitional’  is  a  clue  to  some  of  his  relations  with
pragmatism. According to William James, pragmatism is a mediating philosophy, one that
can reconcile the insights of empiricism and rationalism, of materialism and idealism,
and of  naturalism and phenomenology.  These innovations  can survive  and allow for
further development, while Lotze’s ideas were more rapidly overcome by new techniques
and ideas. The aim of this paper is to describe some of the ways in which the pragmatists
learned  from,  and  reacted  to,  Lotze’s  work.  Peirce  was  largely  disdainful  of  Lotze’s
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contributions but both James and Dewey profited from them in different ways. Dewey
exploited his criticisms of Lotze’s logic in order to develop his own distinctive approach
to  the  subject,  but  James  found  Lotze’s  work  highly  congenial  and  was  willing  to
incorporate his insights in his pragmatism and to his psychological views.2
 
Lotze and James on Psychology
4 James’s  writings provide evidence of  Lotze’s  influence3 upon his  psychological  ideas. 4
Both were eager to put psychology on a scientific footing. We can note a few examples of
such influence, noting especially the role of psychological ideas that had a pragmatist
character.  The  first  example  concerns  the  origins  of  James’s  influential  ideas  about
emotions.  Apparently James wrote ‘Emotions due to bodily reverberations’  on the fly
sheet  of  his  copy of  Lotze’s  Medzinische  Psychologie  (1852),  and this  is  taken to be an
explicit acknowledgment of Lotze’s influence on James’s thought (Myers 1986: 530). A
further illustration of this is found in James’s chapter on ‘The Will’ in James’s Principles of
Psychology.  James  asserts  there  that  Lotze  was  the  first  person to  see  that  muscular
exertion is a form of afferent and not of efferent feeling.5
5 Another example is provided by James’s views about the will. James took from Lotze the
idea that ‘there is a smooth transition from an idea to behaviour that requires no act of
will or effort whatsoever.’ He thus endorsed Lotze’s views as they are expressed by his
saying: ‘All the acts of our daily life happen in this wise: our standing up, walking, talking,
all this never demands a distinct impulse of the will, but is adequately brought about by
the pure flux of thought.’ James attached importance to this passage saying that ‘to recall
this is to avoid the excesses of earlier mentalist psychology which saw the presence of
“wilfulness” in every volitional act (James 1983: 103).
6 A third case concerns ‘ideo-motor action,’ described by James as the principle that ‘once
an idea occupies the mind it will, unless obstructed, seek expression in action.’ This idea
is particularly pertinent to pragmatism, suggesting the sort of link between concepts and
habits of actions which both Peirce and James saw as fundamental to the doctrine. James
credited Lotze together with Charles Renouvier for persuading him of the truth of this
view. So there is some evidence that some of the psychological ideas which provided
foundations for James’s pragmatism were grounded in his reading of Lotze.
 
Lotze and James’s Pragmatism
7 When we turn to James’s 1907 book on Pragmatism we find him often acknowledging
Lotze’s influence or noting similarities between the views of the two philosophers. And
these similarities concern doctrines that are integral to James’s pragmatism. The first of
these passages is in lecture VII on ‘Pragmatism and Humanism.’ James is defending his
account of the difference between pragmatism and rationalism, and he explains that ‘for
rationalism,  reality  is  ready  made  and  complete  from  all  eternity,  while  for  the
pragmatist it is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future’
(James 1907: 123). For the rationalist, ‘the universe is absolutely secure, on the other it is
still pursuing its adventures.’
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8 James links this important pragmatist doctrine to a ‘deep suggestion’ that had been made
by Lotze, when he criticizes a naïve and mistaken conception of reality which we naturally
assume but which reflects the rationalistic outlook
Reality,  we naturally think,  stands ready-made and complete,  and our intellects
supervene with the one simple duty of describing it as it is already. (James 1907:
123)
9 Lotze’s proposed alternative is that ‘our descriptions’ may ‘themselves be additions to
reality.’ Indeed, he suggests that the ‘previous reality’ does not exists in order for us to
obtain knowledge of it which presents just what was there already. Instead, its function is
to
‘[stimulate] our minds to such additions as shall enhance the universe’s total value.’
It is not surprising that James identifies this with ‘our pragmatistic conception.’ The
world is ‘malleable,’ being transformed by our attempts to know it. James cites this
view as adding to our ‘dignity and our responsibility as thinkers’ and remarks upon
how  the  Italian  pragmatist,  Papini,  is  inspired  by  ‘the  view  it  opens  of  man’s
divinely-creative  functions.’  It  is  in  harmony  with  Peirce’s  claim  that  our
contributions  to  inquiry  enable  us  to  make  our  contribution  to  the  process  of
creation. (James 1907: 123)
10 For all pragmatists, the content of a concept is explained in terms of how things behave
in virtue of falling under that concept. As James puts it, the ‘pragmatic method’ involves
interpreting  notions  by  tracing  [their]  ‘practical  consequences.’  Again  in  Pragmatism,
James asks: ‘Is it not time to repeat what Lotze said of substances, that to act like one is to
be one?’ (James 1909: 64). A similar point is made in Essays on Radical Empiricism, where
James endorses Lotze’s claim that ‘to be an entity all that is necessary is to gelten as an
entity, to operate, or be felt, experienced, or in anyway realized, as such’ and recognizes
that his position is in harmony with Lotze’s requirement (James 1912: 85).
 
Pragmatists and Lotze’s Logic
11 So far we have seen evidence that Lotze’s views about mind and reality have much in
common with the kind of pragmatism defended by William James. When we turn to his
views on Logic,  things are different and appear to be subject to pragmatist criticism.
Dewey used Lotze’s Logik in courses on ‘The Logic of scientific methods’ at Michigan in
1890  and  ‘Theory  of  Logic’  at  Chicago  in  1899-1900  (Shook  2000:  188-9),  so  it  is
understandable that Lotze’s approach to logic became his target when he was developing
his own ideas.
12 In 1903, John Dewey published Studies in Logical Theory, a collection of papers by himself
and his students at the University of Chicago which presented what he offered as a new
approach  to  logic.  Dewey’s  own  four  contributions  all  have  as  their  running  title
‘Thought-and its subject-matter,’ and the first carries the title ‘The general problem of
logical theory.’6 The aim of his chapter is to explain how the need for a logical theory
arises,  to contrast two contrasting approaches to the nature of logical theory, and to
make a case for favouring one of the two. The conception of logic that he criticized – in
each of the four papers – was to be found in Herman Lotze’s Logik. Dewey developed his
own conception of logic by criticizing Lotze’s influential views. Where James saw Lotze as
a source of valuable ideas which were compatible with pragmatism, Dewey valued Lotze
as the author of views that should be rejected and he thought that criticizing them will be
a source of positive insights.7
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13 Peirce had doubts about this strategy (CP 8.244). He describes Lotze as ‘in his day, a very
careful, serious inquirer,’ this faint praise becoming fainter when he adds that ‘he was
never a thinker of great subtilty’ (sic). Commenting on Dewey’s book, he remarked that ‘I
regretted your making everything turn on Lotze, as if he were a Hume’ and turned the
screw by remarking that Lotze was ‘rather small game for [Dewey]’ and is now ‘so entirely
left behind, that I thought you might have left his doctrine to be disposed of’ by lesser
thinkers. Where Dewey saw Lotze as a source of instructive mistakes, Peirce denied him
even that merit.
14 On the very first page, Dewey tells us what the logical problem is. It concerns ‘the relation
of thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent, truth, and the relation of
truth and reality’ (1903: 1). And he reminds us that ‘from the naïve point of view,’ such
questions present us with no difficulty since we think about ‘anything and everything,’
often  in  response  to  a  particular  practical  need.  Dewey  suggests  that  the  naïve
standpoint’s account of reasoning is that ‘thinking is an activity which we perform at
specific need, just as at other need we engage in other kinds of activity.’ Moreover, its
‘material’ is ‘anything in the wide universe which seems to be relevant to this need.’ The
naïve point of view can respond to such issues as arise without developing the sort of
general theory that is to be found in logic books. We look for a theory only in special
circumstances, notably when ‘circumstances require the act of thinking and nevertheless
impede clear and coherent thinking in detail; or when they occasion thought and then
prevent the results of thinking from exercising directive influence upon the immediate
concerns of life’ (1903: 4). In other words, we only look for a theory of thinking when our
practice of thinking and our various cognitive and practical presents us with problems,
when our practice loses its familiar ‘organic character.’
15 When this occurs, and we seek a logical theory, that we find ourselves asking questions
that are significantly different from those that are addressed in practical deliberations
and scientific research. When we seek a theory of reasoning, we want something general.
The naïve standpoint assumes that every inquiry or process of reasoning is concerned
with  specific  purposes  and  specific  circumstances.  When  thinkers  like  Lotze  raise
questions about ‘the relation of truth and reality,’ for example, they seem to abstract
from all that is particular and specific in our reasoning and deliberations. The question
that divides Lotze and Dewey concerns just how abstract our logical theories need to be.
16 Lötze’s treatise on Logic was tellingly divided into three parts: ‘Pure logic,’ ‘Applied logic,’
and ‘On Knowledge (Methodology).’ Logic could be applied to the solution of problems
about how we should conduct inquiries and about the evaluation of beliefs. But pure logic
said nothing about psychological states such as beliefs or activities such as inquiries;
instead, it is devoted to ‘thought in general and those universal forms and principle of
thought  which  hold  good  everywhere,  both  in  judging  of  reality  and  in  weighing
possibility,  irrespective of any difference in the objects’  (Lötze 1888:  10-1).  The three
sections  of  his  discussion  of  pure  logic  are  devoted  to  concepts,  judgments,  and
inferences respectively. And in classifying the different kinds of concept, judgment, and
inference, it treats them as ‘ideal forms, which give the matter of our ideas, if we succeed
in arranging it under them, its true logical setting’ (ibid.: 11). Applying these ideal forms
to  concrete  investigations  with  specific  subject  matters  is  a  messy  business:  the
peculiarities of particular subject matters ‘offer resistance to this arrangement’ under the
ideal forms. And ‘applied logic is concerned with those methods of investigation which
obviate these defects.  It  considers hindrances and the devices by which they may be
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overcome; and it must sacrifice the love of systematisation to considerations of utility,
and select what the experience of science has so far shown to be important and fruitful’
(ibid.).
17 Lötze’s approach to logic thus has a two stage character. Pure logic provides us with a
priori  knowledge  of  ideal  forms that  reveal  the  nature  of  concepts,  judgements,  and
inferences.  These  forms  can  then,  with  difficulty,  be  applied  to  concrete  cases.  In
identifying these ideal forms, it abstracts from all empirical information about particular
investigations and particular subject matters. We need such information when we apply
logic to provide guidance in our reasoning and investigations; but it is of no relevance to
the study of the ideal subject matter of pure logic. It is thus a mark of the purity of logic
that it is independent of psychology (1888: 10): when doing pure logic we can ignore the
psychological  processes  that  are  presumably  involved  in  ordinary  reasoning.  Logic’s
starting point is simply that ‘between combinations of ideas, however they may have
originated, there is a difference of truth and untruth, and that there are forms to which
these combinations ought to answer and laws which they ought to obey’ (Lotze 1888: 8).
Information about the genesis of our ideas is irrelevant to pure logic.
18 In  order  to  avoid  relativism and scepticism,  he  thought,  we  need  necessary  laws  of
thought. Our knowledge of such laws is grounded in ‘intuition,’ a faculty that reveals to us
self-evident  truths.  Indeed,  logic  and  other  areas  of  knowledge  rely  upon  axioms  of
whichwe have self-evident knowledge. In constructing logical concepts and identifying
logic laws, we can rely upon a system of categories (roughly of things, properties and
relations), which is reflected in the grammatical categories of ‘substantive,’ ‘adjective’
and ‘verb.’ This presumably ensures that the logical laws will be abstract, as general as is
possible,  and  minimally  dependent  upon  the  specificities  of  particular  thoughts  and
inquiries.
19 This provides the context for Dewey’s defense of his view of logic. He tells us that ‘the
very  nature  of  logical  theory  as  a  generalization  of  the  reflective  process  must  of
necessity  disregard  the  matter  of  particular  conditions  and  particular  results  as
irrelevant.’ So long as logic studies the relations of ‘thought as such’ to ‘reality as such,’ it
seeks abstract and very general formulations.  This is what Dewey finds in Lotze who
holds that ‘pure logic’ is concerned with ‘universal forms and principles of thought which
hold good everywhere both in judging reality and in weighing possibility, irrespective of
any difference in the objects’ (1903: 6).
20 Logical theory is concerned with ‘thought as such – thought at large or in general.’ And it
asks ‘how far the most complete structure of thought […] can claim to be an adequate
account of that which we seem compelled to assume as the object and occasion of our
ideas’ (Lotze 1988: 9). It provides a general abstract account of thought, truth, reference
etc, and it engages with our ordinary practical and scientific deliberations by, like any
abstract  scientific  theory, being  applied  to  concrete  circumstances.  But  these
circumstances,  and the differences between the objects  of  different  thoughts,  can be
safely ignored while we are doing pure logic. So logic achieves generality by dealing with
universal  abstract  laws and principles  that  are binding upon all  possible  thought  and
inference. These can be applied to particular cases, and this can help us in dealing with
problems.  ‘The  entire  procedure  of  practical  deliberation  and  of  concrete  scientific
research’ is thus irrelevant to the project of pure logical theory.
21 Dewey describes this sort of approach to logic as ‘epistemological,’ because it entails that
the fundamental problem of logical theory was to explain ‘the eternal nature of thought
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and its eternal validity in relation to an eternal reality’ (Dewey 1916: 92). As Dykhuizen
put it,  the kind of  logic that Dewey rejects holds that  ‘the function of  thought is  to
represent reality and that the truth of an idea depends upon how faithfully it does this
(1973: 84). The justification for describing such theories as ‘epistemological’ is that once
we  give  a  very  abstract  account  of  thought  and  reasoning,  one  which  ignores  the
specificities  of  particular  episodes  of  reasoning,  we  find  ourselves  facing  sceptical
questions: what reason have we to think that processes if  thought described in these
abstract terms can provide us with knowledge of reality? Such logics force us to confront
fundamental epistemological problems. These concern the relations between thought-as-
such and reality-as-such. This becomes clear in Dewey’s second essay, where he describes
Lötze’s account of the materials of inquiry and the circumstances in which we inquiry. It
is  indeed cast  in  very abstract  terms.  The ‘ultimate material  antecedents  of  thought
consist in impressions, which are due to external objects as stimuli. Taken in themselves,
these impressions are mere psychical states or events’: an impression is nothing but ‘a
state of our consciousness, a mood of ourselves.’ Inquirers then examine patterns which
are sometimes ‘coincident’ and at other times ‘coherent’; and the aim of reasoning is to
‘recover and confirm the coherent, the really connected, adding to its reinstatement an
accessory  justifying  notion  of  the  real  ground  of  coherence,  while  it  eliminates  the
coincident as such’ (1903: 27ff). This ignores all that is specific to any particular inquiry
but, at the same time, captures a common form that fits all. Dewey is scornful of Lötze’s
attempt to somehow get from the impression, which is subjective, to its real ground.
22 It is important here that formal logic did not have a major role in Lotze’s system of pure
logic  (Lotze  1888:  208ff).  In  fact,  he  complained that  contemporary  developments  in
Boolean algebra,  for example,  did little more than give us a notation that offered an
unhelpful restatement of what we all knew already. Rather than being concerned with
the  properties  of  arguments  or  the  logical  forms  of  propositions,  Lotze’s  logic  was
concerned with the a priori principles that made judgement possible. This still left room
for the study of the structure of thoughts and propositions. Lotze relied upon studies of
the  grammatical  structures  of  sentences  to  identify  fundamental  categories  that  our
reflected  in  the  judgments  we  make.  He  relied  upon a  grammatical  classification  of
expressions into substantives, adjectives and verbs, to identify a categorial classification
of the elements of thought into things, properties and relations.
23 Lotze thought  that  the principles  used in logic  are knowable  a  priori,  that  they are
expressed in necessary truths, and that without them, we have no answer to scepticism
and relativism. They take the form of a system of axioms, and when we ask how we are
justified in accepting the axioms, the answer is that they are self-evident. At this point,
Lotze’s  distinction  between  the  genetic  or  psychological  and  the  logical becomes
important. Presumably, in constructing these laws, Lotze would have to reflect upon our
ordinary  practices  of  thinking  and  reflecting;  the  subjective  psychological  processes
involved  in  arriving  at  them  may  be  complex.  But  to  regard  these  reflections  and
processes  as  relevant  to  the  justification  of  these  laws  would  be  to  succumb  to  a
psychologistic error. Once these processes have been completed, the normative standing
of our acceptance of these laws is determined by their self-evidence. There is nothing
further to say about why we are right to accept them and how they are self-evident.
Lotze’s general account of justification is broadly coherentist: in ordinary investigations,
we begin with our simple subjective sensations, we recognize that the patterns among
them  can  be  distinguished  into  those  that  are  ‘coincident’  and  those  that  display
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coherence.  When we think,  we try to carry out  procedures designed to identify  and
preserve coherence. Once we try to use these ideas to relate ‘though-as-such’ to ‘reality-
as-such,’  it  becomes open to charges of vicious circularity.  Lotze’s response that ‘The
circle is inevitable, so we had better perpetrate it with our eyes open’ does not inspire
confidence (Lotze 1880: 451).8
24 Dewey suggests that we should consider a different way of ‘stating the problem of logical
theory.’ The key idea is that, while a general theory will have to abstract from ‘much of
the specific material and contents of thought situations of daily life and critical science,’
it can still identify ‘certain specific conditions and factors, and aim to bring them to clear
consciousness.’  It  seems  to  be  an  empirical  investigation  which  tries  to  identify  the
features that are common to circumstances that prompt inquiry, to ‘show how typical
features in specific circumstances of thought call out to diverse typical modes of though-
reaction,’ and it can ‘attempt to state the nature of the specific consequences in which
thought fulfils its career’ (Dewey 1903: 7). We begin with particular cases, and then
identify patterns involving kinds of particular cases whose laws can be used to deal with
the problems that first give rise to the search for a logic theory.
25 So the big difference between Lotzean logic and Dewey’s logic is that the former seeks
complete  generality,  it  seeks  to  abstract  from all  and  any  of  the  specific  features  of
reasoning and find laws that govern all possible kinds of reasoning and inquiry. Dewey
seeks a kind of generality which is intermediate between this complete generality and a
study of thought which focuses on the particular case and their idiosyncrasies. Awareness
of  the  problems  that  give  rise  to  the  search  for  a  logical  theory  can  guide  us  in
formulating laws governing particular kinds of inquiry, or inquiries that share distinctive
salient  features.  So  we  develop  a  logical  theory  which  already  incorporates  the
classifications we need to use when trying to exercise self-control over our reflection and
inquiry. Logical theory no longer has a two stage character: we don’t construct a general
theory using a vocabulary which is  not  constructed with an eye to how we want to
describe inquiry and reflection. Rather our logical theory already uses the vocabulary of
the theory of inquiry and there is a continuity between our practice of inquiry and the
developing of a logical theory that can guide it. It is relevant to this that Dewey describes
his approach as one of ‘instrumental logic.’9 This is a type of logic which ‘deals with
thinking  as  a  specific  procedure  relative  to  a  specific  antecedent  situation and to  a
subsequent  fulfilment’  (1903:  8).  From  this  perspective,  ‘an  attempt  to  discuss  the
antecedents, data, forms, and objective of thought, apart from reference to particular
position occupied and particular part played in the growth of experience is  to reach
results which are not so much true or false as they are radically meaningless – because
they are considered apart from limits’ (1903: 8). To think about the aims and conditions of
thought ‘apart from the limits of a historic or developing situation, is the essence of a
metaphysical procedure – in the sense of metaphysics which makes a gulf between it and
science’ (1903: 8-9).
26 So Lotze employs a distinction between pure logic and applied logic, the former taking
the form of  a framework of  a priori  knowable necessary truths or principles.  Dewey
rejects  that  distinction;  we can use  our  logical  standards  to  criticize  arguments  and
beliefs without making use of a logical theory with these properties. The use of logic lies
in guiding reflection in dealing with concrete problems, and the role of logical theory is
determined by what is needed for our practice of reasoning. Lotze is associated with a
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kind  of  rationalist  intellectualism  which  James  would  recognize  as  the  enemy  of
pragmatism.
27 A schematic comparison of Lotze, Peirce, and James is useful here, and it will help to
explain Peirce’s disdain for Lotze’s work. Peirce would be in agreement with Lotze about
two important points: both hold to a distinction between pure and applied logic; and both
deny the relevance of psychology and other natural sciences to pure (or, in Peirce’s term,
‘normative’) logic. Dewey would disagree with them on both points. Theory in logic is less
abstract and all encompassing than Lotze or Peirce would accept, both of whom think
that that logical theory must deal with ‘all possible thoughts.’ And he would welcome a
‘rapprochement’ between logic and psychology and natural history. Dewey’s pragmatism
is inseparable from his rejection of Lotze’s pure logic: his rationalism is at odds with
pragmatist ideas. But Peirce thinks that his form of normative or pure logic is compatible
with  pragmatism.  This  is  because  the  achievements  of  which  he  is  most  proud  are
contributions to formal logic. According to Peirce, the epistemology of formal disciplines
need not appeal to suspect concepts such as ‘self-evidence.’
 
Conclusion
28 It is clear that, in very different ways, the philosophical ideas of both James and Dewey
were influenced by their knowledge of Lotze’s writings. This is itself an acknowledgment
of Lotze’s prominent position in the philosophical world of the years either side of 1900.
This is further illustration of the role of European thought in fuelling pragmatism. My
conclusion is a modest one, that a better understanding of this part of the intellectual
context of pragmatism probably has more of offer to our understanding of James and
Dewey than is currently supposed.
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NOTES
1. The  quoted  passage  is  from  David  Sullivan’s  valuable  article  on  Lotze  in  the  Stanford
Encyclopedia of  Philosophy. The passage quoted here is not an idiosyncratic remark by a single
scholar.  Gary  Hatfield  holds  that  between1850  and  1875,  Lotze  was  probably  ‘the  foremost
German academic philosopher and psychologist’ (Hatfield 2003: 98).
2. Lotze also had a role in the development of analytical philosophy. Frege attended his lectures
on logic and studied his Logik. Hans Sluga argues that Frege’s ideas are deeply indebted to those
of  Lotze (1980:  5)  but  Michael  Dummett  has respnded that  this  claim rests  upon a distorted
understanding of the history of philosophy. For our purposes we need to note one important
issue on which they disagreed: Lotze rejected the formalization of logic (1988: 208ff).
3. There is relatively little contemporary literature on the relations between the thought of Lotze
and James, probably because of diminishing interest in Lotze. Otto Kraushaar wrote four papers
between 1936 and 1940 which are listed in the references.
4. For my purposes of this paper, I am more concerned with how the pragmatists responded to
Lotze, and what they took him to be saying, than with issues about whether they understood him
correctly. This is why my claims about Lotze’s influence upon James’s views are generally based
upon James’s testimony.
5. Dewey appeals to Lotze’s account of emotions in his 1916 paper ‘Logic of judgments of practice’
in defence of  a  pragmatist  account of  value judgments.  He attributes to Lotze the view that
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emotions, ‘as involving pleasure and pain’ are ‘organs of value judgments’ or ‘appreciations of
worth’ (Dewey, 1916: 351).
6. The subtitles of the other three papers are ‘The antecedents and stimuli of thinking,’ ‘Data and
meanings’ and ‘The objects of thought.’ All four papers were reprinted, without the running title
as the first four chapters of Dewey’s Essays in Experimental Logic (1916).
7. Ralph Sleeper makes the interesting suggestion that Dewey’s real target was ‘an account of
logic that would avoid both Peirce’s formalism and James’s psychologism.’ His use of Lotze came
from the latter’s attack on the psychologism associated with empiricists such as Mill. He wanted
to show that  a  more radical  version of  empiricism might enable  him to  escape the  a  priori
(Sleeper 1986: 64-5).
8. The passage in which this quotation occurs is given at greater length by Sullivan (2008: 12).
9. In fact, Dewey suggests that someone like Lotze would recognize the value of ‘instrumental
logic,’ but would treat it as an application of pure logic, as something subordinate to fundamental
logical theory (Dewey 1903: 8).
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